Some Issues Regarding IMF and Third World Relations by Al-Ajlani, Riad
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
 
Theses Digitisation: 
https://www.gla.ac.uk/myglasgow/research/enlighten/theses/digitisation/ 
This is a digitised version of the original print thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge 
 
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, 
title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten: Theses 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
research-enlighten@glasgow.ac.uk 
SOME ISSUES REGARDING IMF AND THIRD WORLD RELATIONS
Dissertation submitted in part fulfilment 
for the Award of the Degree of LL.M. 
of the University of Glasgow
Riad Al-Ajlani
December, 1987
ProQuest Number: 10997887
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10997887
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.
Acknowledgements ..  ^ 3
Summary .. 4
Introduction .. 5
Chapter 1 - The Management of International
Monetary Relations since 1945 .. 8
Chapter 2 - The Decision Making Process in
the International Monetary Fund .. 27
Chapter 3 - Adjustment of Disequilibrium:
The Power of the Fund .. 47
Chapter 4 - Third World Demands .. 85
Conclusion .. 10 2
Bibliography .. 107
2
Acknowledgements
I wouldj like to express my sincere gratitude to the following for 
the valuable assistance rendered to me in connection with this work.
First of all, I am deeply grateful to Dr A. Carty, Director of 
LL.M. Development Law Programme at the University of Glasgow and my 
course supervisor, for giving me the encouragement to undertake the 
writing of the dissertation and from whom I have learnt a great deal.
Special thanks are owed to Mr J.P. Grant, Dean of the Faculty of 
Law and Financial Studies, University of Glasgow.
Thanks are due to the staff at the Glasgow University Library, 
especially to Mr Roger Hickman.
I am grateful also to all those who in many ways have contributed 
to the fruition of my course of study.
The views expressed here and any errors are entirely mine.
Riad Al-Ajlani
3
SUMMARY
The aim of this work is to examine the evolving monetary 
relations and its impact on the developing countries, and to question 
the validity of any legal theory in this context.
Chapter 1 deals with the management of the monetary relations 
from the establishment of the Bretton Woods system to the present. It 
shows that Bretton Woods was the institutionalisation of liberal 
economic theory fostered by the developed countries. The rules were 
mainly based along oligarchic principles within the developed capital 
market countries, consequently such rules were unsuited to the poor 
underdeveloped countries' economic situation.
Chapter 2 focuses on the decision-making processes of the IMF 
which excludes any effective participation by developing countries.
Chapter 3 examines the IMF power to adjust payments imbalances 
and highlights the asymmetrical aspect of its operations with special 
reference to its conditionality and its economic and legal 
foundations.
Chapter 4 examines the alternatives for change within the IMF 
especially regarding its policies and decision-making functions which 
Third World countries believe operate to their disadvantage.
By way of conclusion it is being strongly argued that only a 
normative approach can participate to the development of legal theory 
regarding the international monetary relations. It is inevitable that 
economic order requires legal order.
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INTRODUCTION
Ihe chaos and disorder in monetary relations have questioned the 
validity and role: of the international economic organizations which 
were set up to ensure smooth and orderly functioning of the economic 
relations between sovereign states.
The International Monetary Fund is one such organizations where 
its policies and structure have caused fierce debates.
The aim of this paper is to bring into focus some issues in the 
troublesome relations between the International Monetary Fund and the 
Third World.
The first chapter examines the origin and development of the 
management of the international relations starting from the 
establishment of Bretton Woods system until the present day in 
historical perspective. Four points are sought to be comprehended from 
this historical exposition. First, the Bretton Woods system was a 
reflection of the economic and political environment after the second 
World War. It served the liberal economic theory which is based on the 
belief in free trade as an avenue to prosperity and development. The 
period of stability in the monetary relations which followed was 
attributable to the political consensus on broad objectives of the 
monetary and economic plans between the western allied powers. Second, 
the rules which evolved during different stages coincide with 
oligarchic lines dominated by the developed capital market countries 
which have formed concrete financial power centres outside and within 
the IMF management of the monetary relations. Third, an attempt is 
made to identify the role of the IMF in the different periods of the 
management of monetary relations and its response to the changes in 
the international economic environment. The striking aspect is its
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peripheral role. It is no more than an "echo" of the decisions of the 
developed countries. Fourth, the role of the developing countries in 
this process of institutionalization of the international monetary 
relations provides evidence that there is an absence of any active 
participation by them in the formulation of the rules simply because 
at the time when Bretton Woods system was set up they were subject to 
colonial relations and during the following periods they were de facto 
excluded. It should be noted that almost all the major decisions are 
taken by the industrial countries. Developing countries are 
inappropriately represented in the IMF executive organ and even their 
demands for changes in the structure and policies of the IMF are not 
in any precise or rigorous form.
The second chapter deals with the decision making process in the 
IMF. It shows how the structure and the process of decision making 
works to the disadvantage of the developing countries. The composition 
and the appointment of the Executive Directors and the weighted voting 
system together allow the developed countries to exercise a decisive 
influence on the IMF decisions. The introduction of the special 
majority regime by the Second Amendment enhanced the privileged 
position of the developed countries.
The third chapter analyses the power of the IMF to adjust 
disequilibrium. Examination of the instruments which are available to 
the Fund to influence surplus and reserve country currencies reveals 
their gross deficiency. The scarce currency clause cannot become 
operative under the present monetary arrangements. Surveillance in 
effect does not have binding force rather it is merely the summary of 
the Executive Directors' observations. It was suggested that the Fund, 
by providing conditional liquidity for deficit countries, can force 
the surplus countries to adjust their disequilibrium. The limitations
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and shortcoming of this instrument are too obvious to be of any 
effective use. By contrast the IMF's flimsy influence over the 
monetary "system" and the developed countries coincides with 
tightening up its grasp over deficit countries who ask for the Fund's 
credit. These countries have no choice but to accept the Fund's 
prescription in order to gain access not only to the Fund's resources 
but also to other financial resources. The IMF programmes always 
result in social unrest. The origin, development, legal and economic 
foundations of the Fund's conditionality are examined in detail in 
chapter three.
The fourth chapter deals with Third World demands for changes in 
the IMF as embodied in several documents and reports. These countries 
have demanded effective participation in the decision making process 
of the IMF, reorientation of the IMF programmes toward structural 
economic concepts, achievement of symmetry in the IMF programmes and 
increase in its resources. Yet none of these demands provide for a 
real alternative formula neither did they provide for means to 
implement them.
It is being argued that unless these demands are based on a 
coherent set of legal rules they will remain in a stage of rhetoric.
7
CHAPTER 1
THE MANAGEMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY RELATIONS SINCE 1945
8
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the terms under which the 
developing countries are allowed to participate in the management of 
international monetary relations through examination of the structure, 
decision-making process and the policies of the International Monetary 
Fund.
Special methodological problems are inherent in such research. 
These are due not only to the nature of the international society but 
also to the interrelation between economics and politics as well as 
the role of legal concepts in this interaction.
The process of institutionalization of international economic 
relationships after the Second World War resulted in the creation of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Trade 
Organisation (ITO) however the latter never came into existence. The 
constitutive instruments of these organizations were drawn up at the 
Betton Woods Conference in 1944. The negotiations of the Articles of 
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund were dominated by the 
American and the British and despite the divergence of their views in 
respect of the intended organization a final agreement^ was reached. 
Article I spelt out the purposes of the Fund:
i) To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent 
institution which provides the machinery for consultation and 
collaboration on international monetary problems.
ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international 
trade and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance 
of high levels of employment and real income and to the 
development of the productive resources of all members as primary 
objective of economic policy.
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iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange 
arrangements among members and to avoid competitive exchange 
depreciation.
iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of 
payments in respect of current transaction between members and in 
the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the 
growth of world trade.
v) To give confidence to members by making the general resources of 
the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards 
thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in 
their balance of payments without resorting to measures 
destructive of national or international prosperity.
vi) In accordance with the above to shorten the duration and lessen 
the degree of disequilibrium in the international balance of 
payments of members.
The IMF is to achieve its purposes through administration of a 
code of conduct which outlines the "rights" and the "obligations" of 
its members. Article IV enumerated the member's obligation regarding 
exchange arrangement. Article VII deals with the general obligations 
of members. The Fund can best be described as an institution with a 
"unique"^ combination of consultative, regulatory financial and 
technical assistance functions at intergovernmental level.^ Viewing 
these arrangements for the management of the monetary interdependence 
between sovereign states in a political economic context will provide 
a better understanding of the nature and the functions of this process 
of institutionalization of monetary relations. The Bretton Woods 
institutions and rules were reflections of certain events and
10
ideologies and consequently, the institutions and the rules were 
designed to validate certain basic principles.
First, it was recognized that exchange rate adjusment was a 
matter of international concern. In order to avoid the chaos of the 
competitive devaluation of the interwar period the original Articles 
of Agreement provided that par value of all member currencies were to 
be defined in gold terms, exchange dealings must be carried out at a 
rate which do not vary between maximum and minimum by more than one 
per cent.-* A member of the Fund could change the par value of its 
currency after satisfying the Fund that the proposed change is 
necessary to correct "fundamental disequilibrium" but the concept of 
fundamental disequilibrium has never been defined.
It is obvious that this system put the whole burden of adjustment 
upon the exchange rate since it implies that countries would refrain 
from policies which aimed at adjustment of their external balances by 
deflation of their domestic income. The rigidity of this system is 
demonstrated by the fact that a country might only change the parity 
to meet fundamental disequilibrium, the disequilibrium is ipso facto
f.m
in existence by the time action is taken to correct it.
Second, there is an absence of exchange control restrictions. 
Article VII (2) provides - that no member shall, without the approval 
of the fund, impose restrictions on the making of payments and 
transfer for current international transactions. Section (3) requires 
the avoidance of discriminatory currency practices. Section (4) 
provides that all currencies are to be freely convertible into one 
another. The aim of this provision is to encourage free trade. To 
allow a currency of one member to be sold to pay for foreign currency 
is only possible for a strong currency. A country needs foreign 
currency for imports and cannot sell its own currency for the much
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needed foreign currency therfore it embarks upon policies aimed at 
restricting socially useless imports through controls in order to help 
the deficit. This is not only illegal in the terms of the IMF but it 
also exposes the lack of honest bureaucracy to achieve such a policy.^ 
Third, the most important feature of the Bretton Woods agreement 
is that it established an organisation to deal and administer these 
provisions. A brief description of the institutional character of the 
Fund follows and a detailed study would form the basis of Chapter two.
1. Quota, Resources and Drawing Rights:
The quota system is very essential to the governance of the 
Fund^. It determines the subscription of each member to the capital of 
the Fund which represents a large size of the Fund's financial 
resources. It determines the amount which a member can draw from the 
Fund and finally the voting strength of a member. The Fund is 
empowered to borrow from its members as well as from other sources.
Each member has the right to purchase from the Fund in exchange 
for its own currency the currency of another member up to a maximum of 
25 per cent of its quota per annum provided that the total holdings of
Q
the Fund in that currency does not exceed 200 per cent of its qauota. 
It should be noted that this drawing is not automatically available 
but subject to certain conditions. The important one is that the 
member is to satisfy the Fund that currency required is "presently 
needed for making payments which are consistent with the provisions of 
the Agreement". The concept of the conditionality, its development and 
its implications shall be examined and discussed in the third chapter.
The management of the Fund
The Fund was the first international organization where the 
decisions were to be taken by weighted voting system, thus departing
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from the one country one vote rule. The'voting strength of each member 
is determined by the size of its quota which is supposed to reflect 
the country's position in world trade. The present voting system 
ensures that: no decision can be taken acjainst the wishes of the United 
States and the EEC.
The Executive Directors control the real decision making power in 
the Fund. Their appointments, decisions and the voting system in the 
Fund highlight the political aspect of the management of the Fund and 
the rule of the international bureaucracy. The mechanism of the 
decision making process in the Fund will be scrutinized in the second 
chapter.
There is no doubt that the structure of Bretton Woods 
institutions serves the liberal economic theory and the privileged 
positions of the western states through the voting system. The 
weighted voting system was not to be considered as political at 
Bretton Woods.-^ Hie reason for this is intimately connected with the 
concept of the political democracy in the western states according to 
which equality is something that belongs to the political realm and 
has nothing to do with the economy. The IMF is an economic organ thus 
a country's voting strength reflects its economic power. The liberal 
theorists-*--*- rejected the concept of unified political and economic 
order and replaced it with two separate orders. This position was not 
challenged by what is now known as the Third World countries, which 
were at that time politically and economically subordinate and linked 
with the western world in imperial relations. These states had no 
choice but to acquiesce to the rules established for them by their 
former rulers:^
The western states shared the belief in a liberal economic system 
- free trade, market mechanism, minimum barriers to the flow of
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capital and trade, and private owneship - so the rules were designed 
to serve this ideology. In Harry White's words:
"Primarily the Fund is the means for establishing 
and maintaining stability, order and freedom in 
exchange transactions. The resources of the Fund 
are only for the purpose of helping countries to 
keep such policies."^
The concept of international monetary system was very limited 
since it hinged upon the western concept while supports regulations of 
the liberal system through removal of barriers to trade and capital 
flows and the creation of a stable monetary environment to serve these 
purposes. States rather than the international system bear the 
responsibility for stability.-^ This concept is embodied in the IMF 
prescription for balance of payment problems where the emphasis is on 
national and market solutions to monetary problems and the weakness of 
the means which are at the disposal of the IMF regarding its 
regulatory function is a basic feature of the organisation.
The USA, after the war, was the foremost political and economic 
power. It was willing and able to assume the primary responsibility of 
the economic leadership. The Europeans and Japanese were in need of 
the American dollars to reconstruct their industry and finance their 
trade. The USA acted as the world's central bank by providing 
international liquidity and managing the imbalances. In performing 
these functions the USA encouraged protectionism, discrimination 
against dollar and used the Marshall Plan Aid to encourage devaluation 
of many European currencies.^ The American plan worked well and by 
1958 the European and Japanese recovery were almost completed. The 
period from the establishment of the IMF until 1959 can be
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characterized as the unilateral American management of the 
intenational monetary system. The American commitments were the 
centrepiece of the Bretton Woods system and the relative stability of 
the monetary relations during this period can be imputed to the 
coincidence of three conditions.
"The concentration of power in a small number of
states - the existence of a cluster of important
interests shared by western states - the presence
of dominant power willing and able to assume a 
1 f\leadership role. °
During this period (1945 to 1959) it can be properly said that 
the system was in "abeyance".17 The Fund stood aside awaiting 
reconstruction of Europe and for the establishment of free 
convertibility of currencies and multilateral trade - an environment 
in which the Bretton Woods was designed to operate.
Changes in the configuration of the world economic powers and the 
shift toward more pluralistic distribution of economic power 
undermined the American management of the international monetary 
system.
The system was based on the fact that the American dollar should 
provide international liquidity once the foreign holdings of the 
American dollars exceeded the USA gold reserve the whole system would 
be endangered. In 1960 the USA deficit amounted to 3.7 billion 
dollars.1® Ihis was aggravated by the weakness of the sterling pound. 
The return of convertibility of the major European currencies made 
possible large speculative international capital flows which could be 
directed against the pound or the dollar. In 1960 the USA experienced 
the first run on the dollar. In 1960 also there was a run on the
15
pound. Although the American economy remained healthy, the USA could 
no longer manage the system alone. Henceforth the USA would join 
collective management. The USA joined the Basle group and its 
participation enabled the Basle group to manage important aspects of 
the international monetary system. A second management which developed 
at this time was the Group of Ten. This grouping of the ten countries 
with their developed capitalist economy and with their voting power in 
the IMF was to assume main responsibilities for key issues in monetary 
management. They provided a forum for discussion, exchange of 
information and proposals and negotiation of international monetary 
relations1 ;^ the creation of SDR and the General Arrangement to 
borrow. In Dam's words2 :^
"the Group of Ten provided the possibility for 
alternative institutional approach to some key 
issues of the international monetary policy."
The degree of interdependence was increased by the international­
ization of banking and the emergence of international banking 
consortia, the Eurodollar market, which is beyond the jurisdiction of 
any state and which is a large uncontrolled international capital 
market. The availability of huge sums were highly destabilizing. The 
American deficit affected the economic conditions in Europe and Japan 
and both became increasingly dissatisfied with the system where 
international liquidity depends on American deficit but at the same 
time they assumed no responsibility on their growing surplus. By late 
summer 1971 there was a decline in the American gold stock to $10 
billion versus outstanding foreign dollar holdings estimated at about 
$80 billion.21 On 15 August 1971, President Nixon announced his 
famous decision that the USA would no longer convert dollar into gold
«
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and actually put an end to Bretton Woods institution without any 
consultation with the Fund.
After the United States decision on the 15 August 1971, which was 
never condemned by the Fund, the Group of Ten engaged in a series of 
negotiations which ended with an agreement at the Smithsonian 
Institution in Washington in December 1971.
The Smithsonian Agreement provided for realignment of exchange
rates among the Group of Ten.^2 The United States agreed to devalue
the dollar in relation to gold by 7.89 per cent, the German Mark was
revalued, the Japanese agreed to establish a new yen-dollar parity.
The Group decided to allow currencies to float within a plus or minus
2-1/4 per cent of parity instead of 1 per cent which was provided by
the Articles of the IMF. However, the dollar remained inconvertible
and the new price of $38 per ounce became in the phrase of the time,
73the price at which the United States did not buy or sell gold.
Dam observed that the minor role of the Fund in these 
developments is on account of the fact
"that the United States still did not accept its 
convertibility obligation under Article VIII (4) 
thus the entire structure of the Articles was no 
longer squarely placed on its Bretton Woods 
foundation. Indeed the Fund was faced with major 
difficulties even in giving the legal effect to 
the agreements reached at Smithsonian. One problem 
was that although the United States had argued to 
raise the official price of gold, the executive 
branch had no authority to do so and in the event 
did not receive congressional approval until March
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1972. Hence it was in no position to communicate a 
new par value to the Fund, and the Fund was 
consequently unable to approve non-existent new 
par values.
The Fund amazingly referred to Article IV (4) a as the legal basis to 
legalise the new arrangements!
The Smithsonian Agreement was a form of "crisis control"; it 
neither resolved the inconvertibility of the dollar nor the adjustment 
of the problem, although it provided for more flexibility in exchange 
rates. A year later massive currency flows led to new presure on the 
Smithsonian rates and by 1973 all major currencies were floating.
In contrast to the Bretton Woods, the international monetary 
arrangements which evolved after 1972, did not follow any planned or 
conscientious developments. There is less clear agreement on the 
"rules of the game", every participant was left to choose its own 
strategy.Ihe only obvious common element is to place more reliance 
on the market mechanism. Despite the increase of interdependence in 
the international financial relations, maximisation of the conflict of 
objectives of economic policies resulted and no institutional 
mechanism with power to minimize this conflict was provided. The 
developing countries' position was worsened not only because of their 
exclusion from participation in forming the present arrangements and 
the lack of efficient active market mechanism, but also because of the 
influence which the developed countries can exercise on market 
conditions and on the international lending especially interest rate. 
Another feature of this period is the intensification of balance of 
payment problems of oil importing countries and the growth of the 
importance of the commercial lending. The increase in oil prices 
resulted in creation of huge surpluses which were recycled through
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international commercial lending rather than international 
institutions. The oil producing countries were encouraged by the OECD 
governments to grasp the opportunity for quick profit. There was also 
a change in the pattern of lending; bank lending shifted from private 
to public sector borrowers; from long term to short term; from fixed 
to floating interest rate and from trade-related and project related 
credit to balance of payments financing.2  ^ The absence of 
international machinery to supervise this lending, the votality of 
exchange rates, increase in interest rates, deterioration in the terms 
of trade of the developing countries, all combined to result in 
chaotic monetary relations. Again the "system" is in "abeyance".
The most interesting part of all this is the Fund's position in 
these changes. The creation of Special Drawings rights, by the first 
amendment of the Articles which was negotiated between the Group of 
Ten, outside the Fund and incorporated into the Articles, did not 
reduce the American deficit nor enhanced the transfer of resources to 
the developing countries, nor established an international reserve 
currency. The reason is that it is based on "undertakings" by the 
surplus countries to provide "convertible currencies". The limitation 
of the SDR is quite obvious. It requires an 85 majority vote to create 
it if a global need arises for liquidity thus not ensuring effective 
response to the special needs of the developing countries especially 
when linked to the quotas.28 It will be noted in the third chapter 
that the first amendment gives the Fund the authority to examine a 
member's request for a credit consequently it imposes its conditions 
on the member who applies for the Fund's credit thus putting the 
pressure of adjustment on deficit countries seeking the Fund's 
financial resources, without an attempt to empower the Fund with 
equivalent instruments to influence surplus and reserve country
19
currencies. In contrast the General Arrangement to Borrow, which was 
also negotiated among the Group of Ten would permit them to escape the 
Scarce Currency clause and to avoid any domestic changes in their 
economic p o l i c i e s . ^  absolute control of the industrial countries 
over the financial relations and the IMF is enhanced not only because 
of their grouping, Group of Five, Seven, Ten, but also by the special 
majority regime, which was introduced by the Second Amendment of the 
Articles. This regime gives the USA veto over vital issues for the 
developing countries; increase and decrease in the number of elective 
Executive Directors; allocation or cancellation of special drawing 
rights; overrule of decision of committee on interpretation; 
adjustment of quotas; all these require 85 per cent of total voting 
power. It guarantees that nothing can be done against the wishes of 
USA and the EEC. The growing leverage of the IMF over the developing 
countries has coincided with diminutive influence over the developed
4
countries and the "reform" of "international" monetary "system". "The 
Committee of Twenty" - now "the Interim Committee" - ended up with 
minimal proposals.
It called for the establishment of Interim Commttee of the Board 
of Governors with advisory role and for a council with decision making 
power to supervise the management and adoption of the monetary system. 
Regarding the adjustment process and exchange rates, it called for 
more effective and symmetrical adjustment process with an exchange 
rate regime based on stable but adjustable par values. It recommended 
re-introducing an appropriate form of convertibility and close 
consultation and surveillance. It also called for promoting SDR as the 
principal reserve asset and the role of gold and resereve currencies 
to be reduced.
One writer described these aspects of reforms as "superficial"
20
and purely "cosmetic" and this description of superficiality applies 
as well to the subsequent decisions of the interim committee and its 
meeting in Jamaica which apart from acknowledging the reality of 
floating exchange rates, was principally concerned with enlargement of 
national quotas in the IMF and disposition of the Fund's own gold 
holdings.
The reason why the monetary reform has remained an elusive goal
is:
"the absence of some agreed mechanism to ensure 
compatibility among the external policy objectives 
of separate national governments. This is the 
problem of consistency essentially political in 
nature it underlies and conditions of all the 
traditional economic issues of reform"
The "rules" which evolved in all these stages are the results of 
ad hoc negotiations, the debators were largely officials and 
economists. Consequently they are drafted in such generalised language 
so the legal content was left vague . Carty noted:
"The IMF is legally bound to carry out these aims 
but they are not defined with such precision that 
one can say in a particular case whether it is 
observing or is obliged by the terms of its 
constitution"^ ^
The Second Amendment of the Article authorised members to 
intervene when the market is disorderly or rate movements erratic. It 
is left to the judgement of each state to consider what the 
"disorderly" market or "erratic" movements of rates are and to its own
21
corrective action. The American view is that fundamental market forces 
comprise a much wider range of factors notably capital movements while 
for the European countries. "Fundamental" refers primarily to the 
current balance of payments.
Furthermore, this tactic not only precludes systematic approach 
to the monetary relations but also bring greater political pressure on 
the negotiations. Therefore it is not surprising that these rules have 
temporary effects and do not participate in the development of legal 
theory regarding international monetary relations.
22
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CHAPTER 2
DECISION MAKING PROCESS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FOND
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The decision-making proces in the IMF has its own salient 
significance1. Iliis is due to a variety of factors inter alia the IMF 
as a "task oriented organization" with a capacity to adopt "binding 
decisions on the organization and on the members", usually deals with 
matters which are "sensitive aspects" of the sovereignty of states. 
Consequently, they are of great importance to the "political 
authorities" of the members. Secondly, the functions of the IMF 
directly affect "significant values". "Those in control of these 
values" will generally design "structural and procedural devices to 
ensure for themselves the means of exerting special influence" and by 
"specifying doctrines according to which decisions should be taken". 
Thirdly, the practical consequences of the IMF decisions have their 
direct impact on the "living conditions of members and their peoples" 
which are seeking the financial support of the IMF. Fourthly, the 
"operational decisions" of the IMF are usually taken by a small group, 
the Executive Directors whose operations constitute a significant 
aspect in the decision making process of the IMF. In other words, 
these decisions turn into policies which can be directed towards 
either reinforcing or transforming not only the international status 
quo but also the domestic one. The effects of these policies are more 
evident on the domestic scale than the international scale. No wonder 
there are pledges in local election campaigns to suspend dealing with 
the IMF.
The increase of politicization of international economic 
relations has fundamentally influenced the outcome of the decision 
making process in the IMF. This is not due to the weighted voting 
system only but to other various reasons, for example, the way the 
Executive Directors are appointed by their governments and their dual 
loyalty. They regard themselves as political delegates rather than
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contributors to a pool of technical knowledge, the limited size of the 
Executive Board, the "rules" which allow members great latitude in 
interpretation according to their perceived national interests. The 
projection of the Executive Directors as representatives of the 
organization consequently as an "independent" body cannot stand any 
test.
This combination in addition to the concentration of power in the 
Executive Directors, the question of the finality of IMF decisions, 
and the external pressure groups, have resulted in the "elite 
management of the Fund". The power structure and the policies of the 
IMF are two inseparable issues: the power structure has produced a set 
of policies and any change in the policies necessitates change in this 
structure.
The IMF Decision Making System
Decision making in international organization takes place within 
a context of the functions, the institutional framework and the 
historical development of the agency.^ The basis of the IMF decision 
making model is that the members are legally bound by decisions taken 
by simple and special majorities reached on the basis of the weighted 
voting power. The "weighted voting" system was included in the early 
proposals for establishing the IMF. Keynes's plan^ provided for a 
simple voting system, that is, the voting strength of each member 
would be in proportion to its quota while White's plan4 proposed a 
system which is partly based on the traditional one state one vote 
whereby each member would have given 100 basic votes based partly on 
quota with an additional vote for each million dollar of quota. The 
White's system was finally adopted at Bretton Woods. Each member was 
allocated 250 basic votes plus one additional vote for each $100,000,
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c;
now 100,000 SDR by the first amendment. The basic vote principle is 
to serve several purposes, namely:
"... to pay some homage to the traditional 
principle of the equality of states, to avoid too 
close an analogy to the private business 
corporation, to guard against too great 
concentration of voting power in the hands of one 
or two members, and the members who have too small 
a quota would have virtually no sense of 
participation in the affairs of the Fund if their
f.
voting power depended only on their quota".
Since countries cannot choose their own quotas the amount of each 
quota allocated to each member became a major political concern. The 
methods of determining quota went through many deliberations before
7
adoption of "Annex A" of the Articles of the Agreement. Keynes 
proposed that
"the initial quota might be fixed by reference to 
the sum of each country's imports and exports on 
the average of (say) three years equal or in a 
determined lesser proportion to this amount, a 
special assessment being substituted in case where 
this formula would be for any reason 
inappropriate".
This formula did not solve the question what is meant by 
"inappropriate" and what "criteria would be employed in working out 
special assessment".8 White suggested9 in additon to the 
international trade criterion other indicators such as gold holdings,
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gold production, national income, population, foreign investment and 
foreign debts. In the joint statement there was no mention of criteria 
on which quota would be based but rather a vague provision stating 
that "the distribution of voting power shall be closely related to the 
quotas".-^ The explanatory memorandum known as "questions and 
answers" which accompanied the "joint statement" outlined the formula 
for determining quotas viz:
- 2 per cent of the national income of 1940
- 5 per cent of the holdings of gold and gold-convertible exchange,
as of January 1, 1944
- 10 per cent of average annual imports, 1934-38 inclusive
- 10 per cent of maximum variation in annual exports, 1934-38.
The sum of these four data should be increased by the percentage ratio
of a fifty factor to national income in order to augment the quotas of 
countries particularly dependent on international trade.-^
Lister commented on this formula as follows:
"... among other things, the formula had been
designed to produce results that would fulfil the
following political requirements: (1) a quota of
about $2.5 billion for the United States (2) a
quota of about half as large for the United
Kingdom, and (3) the USSR and China were to have
1 9the third and fourth quota".
This system reflected the economic conditions which were 
prevalent at the time of the establishment of the IMF, but showed 
little regard for the problems that would arise in the system's future 
practice. It continued to be used for many years despite the fact that
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it was a "clumsy instrument"11 for setting borrowing limits and voting 
power. The function of quota as a weighter of voting power and limiter 
of drawings on the Fund's resources was accompanied by certain 
anomalies. For example, when a country suffers from a shortage of 
foreign currency, it would need higher borrowing limits to offset this 
temporary trend. One of the main purposes of the Fund is to provide 
financial assistance to overcome balance of payment problems without 
resorting to measures distractive to national and international 
prosperity, at the same time this fluctuation would cast doubts on the 
country's capacity to contribute to the financial stability of the 
Fund and thus to its voting entitlement,
"... the same sort of anomaly arises in reverse 
with regard to the national income indicator, 
which can be justified in terms of the guidelines 
for establishing voting power but seems somewhat 
irrelevant in the context of drawing entitlement.
Despite the difficulty of meeting complex and 
sometimes conflicting objectives simultaneously 
the quota system has continued to form the main 
basis not only for voting power and borrowing 
limits but also in connection with the allocation 
of seats on the Executive Board, in recent years 
of special drawing rights".14
There is a need for objective criteria for adjusting quotas, 
establishing new quota and to be responsive to the members short 
term's needs. In 1979 the Executive Board adopted a decision to review 
the
"... customary method of calculating quotas after
32
completion of the seventh General Review of
Quotas. Such a review will examine the quota
shares of members in relation to their position
in the world economy with a view to adjusting
their shares better to reflect member's relative
economic positions while having regard to the
desirability of an appropriate balance in the
i rcomposition of the Executive Board".
The adjusted and revised formulas were adopted and the quota
"I C
calculated for each member on the basis of these revised formulas. 
Adjustment of Quotas
Article III (2) provided for adjustment of quotas as follows:
"The Board of Governors shall at intervals of not 
more than five years conduct a general review, and 
if it deems it appropriate propose an adjustment, 
of the quotas of the members. It may also, if it 
thinks fit, consider at any other time the 
adjustment of any particular quota at the request 
of the member concerned".
1 7The consent of a member is necessary to adjust its quota. An
eighty-five per cent majority of the total voting power shall be
required for any change in quotas.18 The recent increase became.
effective on April 20, 1986. 142 members consented to increase in 
19their quotas.
Majority Voting
The basic rule for taking decisions in both the Board of 
Governors and the Executive Board is by votes cast. Article XII
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stipulates:
"Except otherwise specifically provided all the 
decisions of the Fund shall be made by a majority 
of the votes cast".
This rule does not apply if the Articles provide for special majority. 
Under the original Articles nine provisions required special 
majorities. By the first amendment the number is increased to 18 and 
it was raised to 39 by the second amendment.^ Gold attributed this 
tendency to increase the number of decisions for which special 
majorities of the total voting power of members or participants are 
required to the wish to "moderate the influence of weighted voting 
power", to "approximate the effect of a rule of unanimity", to give 
"formal recognition to the informal policy of taking decisions by 
consensus or by broad consent"; "the result in part of the wider 
distribution of economic and financial strength among the members of 
the Fund or groups of them than in the earlier years of the 
organization", "the increased number of developing countries" and to 
the "increase in the powers of the Fund and the content of some of the 
new powers".^A
All the IMF special majorities are based on proportions of the 
total voting power. However Article XXVI 2(b) stipulates in addition 
the majority of Governors having 85 per cent majority of the 
participants.
The special majority model represents a compromise between 
decisions to be taken by a simple majority of votes cast and the 
unanimity system. While the first maximizes the opportunities for 
adoption of a decision at the same time it increases the chances that 
a member's objection to a particular proposal may be overriden.
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Devising a system of special majorities requires balancing a number of 
variables. The negotiator of large countries usually are reluctant to 
set up a system where decisions can be taken against their 
government's wishes and at the same time they ensure that their 
proposals are not to be blocked especially where the issue concerns 
granting important powers to an organization. The special majority 
system would allow a "delegation of powers to intergovernmental body 
or otherwise it would be impossible".^1 Lister notes as follows:
"A high special majority signifies that the 
membership as a whole is prepared to accept 
greater constraints on action in return for a 
greater security, while a lower one shows that is 
ready to accept greater risk in order to
9 9
facilitate the taking of action".
For countries of modest voting power a high special majority 
enhances their capacity to block a decision and forces them to 
formation of a vote blocking group.
One predominant characteristic of the decision making process in 
the Executive Board is the technique of non-voting. Gold endeavoured 
to explain this phenomenon thus:
"The origins of the tradition of non-voting are not 
easy to discover. One reason may be that because 
members are involved in the decisions taken by the 
Executive Directors, there is reluctance to employ 
the brusquerie of voting against states even 
though they are in a minority. This courtesy is 
certainly apparent in the collegial relations 
among executive directors. The wide disparity in
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the voting power of members is probably another 
reason. Members with great voting power are 
cautious about employing it and those with small 
voting power are careful not to oppose 
insubstantial reasons. The absence of 
confrontation tactics promotes even further an 
atmosphere of reciprocal consideration. Experience 
has shown that decisions can be reached more 
easily, and more likely to be observed, if they 
are taken with widespread consent. The patient 
negotiation of consent is particularly important 
in connexion with the decisions taken by the Fund 
in the definition of its regulatory jurisdiction 
and in the exercise of much of it".
It is a highly contentious question whether the "collegial 
relation" among sovereign states with conflicts of interests, has any 
tangible influence on financial matters, especially if the composition 
of the Executive Board is taken into account. No evidence can 
demonstrate that consensus enhances the efficiency of decision making 
process in an international organization. The rule C-10 of the Rules 
and Regulations adopted by the Executive Directors as early as 
September 25, 1946, called for the chairman to ascertain the sense of 
the meeting in lieu of a formal vote. The question is whether the 
sense of the meeting is in fact the strength of the voting power. Some
writers are of the view that consensus is the "invisible weighted
,,24voting power .
Adjustment of Voting Power
Article XII Section 5 provided for adjustment of voting power in
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two cases: 1) A decision under Article V 4 on whether the Fund will 
waive any of the conditions of Article V 3(a), on which members are 
entitled to purchase the currencies of other members, 2) A decision to 
declare a member ineligible under Article V 5, to make further 
purchase from the Fund or to make further purchases beyond a certain 
limit because the member is using the resources of the Fund in a 
manner contrary to the purposes of the Fund. The purpose of this 
Article is to increase the voting strength of members if the Fund has 
sold net amounts of their currencies to other members and to decrease 
the voting strength of members if they have purchased net amounts of 
the currencies of other members.^
The Executive Board
The IMF as an international organization based on weighted voting 
system and its functions which impinge on the national economic 
policies highlights the issue of its management. From the very 
beginning the American and the British had rather different views 
about this issue. At Bretton Woods they agreed that the structure of 
the Fund would be composed of the Board of Governors where every 
member would be represented by its finance ministers. It would meet 
annually and would delegate all but the most important decisions to 
the Executive Directors. Five countries with the largest voting power 
would have their own Executive Directors and other members would be 
grouped in constituencies which would each elect an Executive 
Director.^ The British hoped for
"... a technical governing body free from political 
control to develop a sense of corporate
responsibility to all members and not the need to
27guard the interest of a particular country".
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Keynes argued for
"... part-time directors with financial expertise 
and a high standing ain national treasuries who 
would bring to the Fund's policy decisions both 
expert knowledge of national needs and conditions 
and commitment to the international aims ofthe 
Fund"
The American preferred
"... full time directors meeting in continuous 
session and Washington as a base of the Fund
9Q
headquarters".
Dam observed, however, that
"... permanent Executive Directors, especially if 
located in Washington, would be more likely to be 
bureaucrats than bankers".3^A
Eventually, the American view prevailed.
The Executive Board is responsible for conducting the business of 
the Fund and shall exercise all the powers delegated to it by the 
Board of Governors,3*^ which has made the maximum delegations to the 
Executive Directors that the Articles of Agreement permit. The 
Articles reserved to the Board of Governors power over certain 
matters.33 This reservation of power does not prevent action by the 
Executive Board on the subject matter. The Articles of Agreement 
conferred directly certain powers to the Executive Board, and the 
exercise of these powers does not depend upon a delegation from the 
Board.33 The Executive Board now consists of five Executive Directors
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appointed by the five members having the largest quotas (USA, UK, 
France, Federal Republic of Germany, Japan), one appointed by Saudi 
Arabia3  ^ and 16 Executive Directors elected by the rest of the 
membership which is divided into negotiated constituencies; 16 
Executive Directors for 145 countries!
The number of votes allocated to each member is the same in the
Board of Governors and the Executive Board but there are differences
in the way of casting the number of votes allocated to each member
which consequently affects the attainment of majorities. In the
Executive Board each appointed Executive Director casts the number of
votes allotted to the member that appointed him and each elected
Executive Director casts as a unit the number of votes that counted
35toward his election.
Gold argues that when the Executive Directors adopt a decision 
such decision
"... is not a decision of members or even of the 
collectivity of members in some non-institutional 
sense, but it is a decision of the institution 
itself".36
He referred to the Articles of Agreement and By-laws Section 19 to 
support his argument. 1. Article XII (8) which differentiates between 
Governors, Executive Directors, Alternates and a representative 
appointed under Article XII (3) which authorizes the Board of 
Governors to adopt regulation under which a member not entitled to 
appoint an Executive Director sends a representative upon the member's 
request, if a matter is particularly affecting that member. At the 
same time he indicates that the dual loyalties which spring from the 
fact that an Executive Director does not owe his duty entirely to the
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Fund might cause "extramural effects".37 Any international 
organization is an aspect of international relations. Changes in the 
distribution of the economic and political relations would be 
reflected in the executive organ of any organization. It is quite 
unwise to project the Executive Board as an independent body free from 
the politics of its members where decisions represent the interest of 
the international community as a whole and consensus reached through 
"free" negotiations among independent Executive Directors whereby 
facts are examined and rational techniques applied to them. These 
conditions are not present especially when there are major conflicts 
of interests. The rational techniques are less likely to be determined 
and the whole process depends on the bargaining power of the parties 
involved. The relation between an Executive Director and his 
government is a crucial one. Some governments seek to control the 
position of their directors within the Fund, for example, in the 
United States the appointment for the post of Executive Director is a 
presidental choice subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. 
Once an Executive Director is appointed he is under the instructions 
of "Special National Advisory Council".88 The resignation of a senior 
IMF counsellor "in protest at the increasing political use made of the
OQ
organization by the United states'017 is a clear example. The influence 
which is the ability to modify the behaviour of others plays a central 
role in an organization with limited function, based on weighted 
voting system and managed by a small group and consequently becomes a 
major constraint upon the determinants of decisions.40
Killick noted that:
"... the stringency of policy conditions will in 
practice often depend upon whether the government
40
which has applied for a credit has powerful allies 
within the Executive Board. If a country is 
thought to be of key political or strategic 
importance the Executive Directors of the more 
powerful countries may lobby the Managing 
Director, the result often being a softening of 
the terms. Vietnam has been prevented from 
obtaining credit altogether because of a de facto 
US veto".41
The U.S. attitude which prevented Vietnam from obtaining a credit 
forced the Executive Board to approve $36 million for El Salvador in 
1983 despite the opposition of other Executive Directors who refused 
at the beginning to approve the El Salvador application on technical 
ground.4^
The IMF decision making model does not allow any effective 
participation by the developing countries which are most affected by 
its decisions despite the fact that the developing countries, as a 
group, enjoy a veto over the decisions of the IMF. It was estimated 
that the developing countries have nearly 32 per cent majority of the 
total voting power.43 This increase in their voting power has never 
been matched with a capacity to influence the Fund's decision for they 
can block a decision if a formal vote takes place but they cannot 
force the Fund to adopt a decision simply because they cannot achieve 
the required majority. It was noted earlier that the increase of the 
special majorities, introduced by the Second Amendment of the 
Articles, give the U.S. veto power over key issues and ensures that no 
decision can be taken without the concurrence of the EEC. Other 
consequences which follow from the system and which go beyond the 
objection to the weighted voting system as inroads on the sovereign
41
equality of states, are for example, the fact that the IMF decision 
making system has fragmented the interactions between its members 
forcing them into groups instead of harmonizing their views and 
promoting a kind of collective view within its framework; the French 
lobby on behalf of the countries of Francophone Africa; Britian on 
behalf of other Commonwealth countries,^ consequently, enhancing the 
role of the developed countries while and undermining the developing 
countries' position as a whole. If the IMF is to oversee the function 
of the "international monetary system" a basic fact must be realised 
and that is, a system cannot be dependent on the will of few states.
The weighted voting system must be understood to mean "power must go
with responsibility".
One of the arguments against transforming the decision making 
process of the Fund into a democractic one is based on the
"efficiency". Haberler argues that
"... any reforms that would make the IMF 
democractic and universal and its support 
automatic would make it inefficient and 
ineffective and would lead to its eventual demise 
as a useful instrument of world economic 
development. It should not be turned into a 
satellite or replica of the United Nations".
The efficiency of any international organization is measured by 
its impact upon its environment as well as its capacity to realign its 
environment according to its purposes. One may wonder about the 
efficiency of the IMF rule to promote exchange stability and to 
maintain orderly exchange arrangements.
Proposals for changes are discussed in the fourth chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
ADJUSTMENT OF DISEQUILIBRIUM: 
THE POWER OF THE FUND
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One of the criteria by which the efficiency of any system is 
judged is its capacity to influence its subjects equally. While the 
Fund has developed the concept of conditionality and invented the 
technique of stand-by arrangement to impose its concept of adjustment 
on deficit countries seeking its financial resources, any analysis of 
the means which are available to the Fund to influence the policies of 
surplus countries exhibits their limitation and the need to review the 
Fund mechanism in this respect. The first part of this chapter 
examines the Fund's instruments to influence the surplus and reserve 
currency countries. The second part deals with conditionality.
Scarce Currency Clause
The clause was first suggested by White. ^ White anticipated that 
a currency of a surplus membere - US dollar - might be under too much 
demand from deficit country members. Therefore the Fund's holdings of 
this currency would be depleted, the Fund in such a case is to take a 
decision declaring that the currency is scarce, consequently 
authorising the members to discriminate against the issuer of the 
currency by limiting exchange transactions in the currency. This 
authorization is recommendatory in character and the members cannot be 
compelled to discriminate.2 The declaration does not require any 
finding that the issuer has violated the Articles of Agreement. Gold 
explained:
"The policies of a member in persistent surplus in
its balance of payments that create a scarcity of its
currency are not treated by the Articles as a breach of
obligation notwithstanding the economic undesirability . -
i 3of the member's policies".
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This clause recognises the joint responsibility of both surplus 
and deficit countries. Although it was first proposed by the American 
plan, its inclusion in the Articles came as a result of the insistence 
of the United Kingdom which feared that a large and persistent surplus 
by the United States would be responsible for large and persistent 
deficits of many other countries. The question which arises here is 
why this clause has never been implemented especially in recent years 
where the balance of payments of the USA is in persistent deficit, 
while there are surpluses in the balance of payments of the Federal 
Republic of Germany and Japan. To answer this question one has to 
examine the conditions which must be satisfied before activating this 
clause. Roessler^ argues that Article V provided that members can only 
purchase a currency that is presently needed for making in "that 
currency" payments which are consistent with the provisions of the 
Agreements. The requirement "that currency" is meant to limit drawing 
to the currency with which the drawing member has a bilateral deficit, 
as the American negotiators explained that^
"the Fund could not use the currency of one country 
to help maintain stability of the exchange of 
another country if the deficit giving rise to the 
pressure on the exchange is with a third country".
As a result of the setting up of a multilateral system of 
payments in the late 1950's the need to finance the settlement of 
official currency holdings in specific surplus countries currenciees 
has not arisen.5 In 1962 the Executive Board adopted a decision which 
dealt with the problems of selecting currencies for drawings.6 It 
laid down three criteria governing the selection of currencies. First 
the balance of payments position of the country whose currency is
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considered for drawing. Second, the country's reserve position. 
Thirdly, the Fund's holdings of the country's currency. These 
arrangements ensure that there is always a minimum supply of all 
currencies. Ihere are other reasons which explain the reason why the 
scarce currency clause cannot become operative under the present 
system. For one thing, the Fund is empowered to replenish its holdings 
of the currency by asking the member to sell its currency to the Fund 
for gold, the Fund now may compel replenishment for SDRs instead of 
gold. The Fund may also replenish its holdings by borrowing the 
currency by agrement with the lender and with the concurrence of the 
issuer if it is not itself the lender. However, it must be noted that 
Article VII (1) i which empowered the Fund to borrow from a member also 
provided that no members would be obliged to lend to the Fund. To 
overcome this obstacle a new arrangement - the General Arrangement to 
Borrow - was signed and subsequently incorporated in the Articles of 
Agreement. Another reason is the Fund's reluctance to employ remedies
7
and its "distaste" for discrimination.
Exposure to Inflationary or Expansionary Pressures
It was suggested in the IMF Annual Report 19698 that the Fund by 
providing substantial amounts of financial assistance to deficit 
countries, can exert expansionary or inflationary pressure on surplus 
countries, consequently forcing them to contribute to the adjustment 
process. The Report states as follows:
"Conditional liquidity can make a major 
contribution to the adjustment process while the 
behaviour of countries in payments surplus is not 
directly affected by these facilities, the fact 
that Fund assistance permits the deficit country
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to finance its deficit rather than to suppress it 
has an expansionary effects on the surplus 
countries and thus puts them under pressure to 
play their part in correcting the situation".®A
The manipulation of inflationary or expansionary pressure has its 
limitation. The Fund's financial assistance is too insignificant to 
produce this effect. It is very doubtful that the conditions which are 
attached to Fund's financial assistance would help to produce this 
end. Roessler explained that this pressure is too indiscriminate to be 
of practical use:
"This pressure cannot normally be directed against 
individual surplus countries; it will be felt by 
all countries, whether they are in surplus, 
deficit, or equilibrium. In most situations, this 
instrument of exercising influence will therefore 
be much too indiscriminate to be of practical use.
Only if there is a single surplus country while 
the rest of the world in deficit would the effects 
of the policy be confined to its target".^
Surveillance
The Fund under Article IV has the duty to oversee the 
international monetary system in order to ensure its effective 
operations. The Fund must exercise "firm surveillance" and adopt 
"specific principles" for "guidance" of members, to ensure the 
compatability of economic policies of the members with the objectives 
CJ0-J- out in Article IV(1) and the "compliance of each member with its 
"obligations". One writer pointed out that
"...the introduction of surveillance gave the Fund
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broader responsibilities with respect to oversight 
of it member's policies than existed under the par 
value system".-*-®
Under the par value system, a member was required to seek the Fund's 
concurrence when it proposed a change in the par value of its 
currency. After the introduction the floating rate system by the 
Second Amendment, the Fund is to review members' economic policies - 
not only their exchange rate policies - but its members are no longer 
obliged to seek its concurrence in changes in exchange rates. The Fund 
adopted several decisions regarding surveillance.^ However, the 
continuing volatility of exchange rates and their prolonged divergence 
from levels that appear to be sustainable over time, have questioned 
the effectiveneess of the Fund's surveillance. There are various 
reasons which prevent the surveillance to be of any practical 
significance.
Under Article IV, consultations between the Fund and member are
the basic instruments for the Fund's exercise of surveillance. These
consultations are carried out by the Executive Director, for the
developed countriese - as it was noted in Chapter Two - the
composition of the Executive Board ensures that nothing can be done
against their wishes. Furthermore, the consultations result in
12
"conclusions" — the chairman's summing up ratner than decisions .
In addition, the outcome of the consultation is confidential. Dam
noted that
"... unless consultations have produced new 
principles that then bind members in later 
consultation .... the consultations do not 
represent from legal point of view any substantial
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development from those already held by the Fund 
with members under Article VII and XIV".13.
Reading through both the provisions of Article IV and Fund's 
decision regarding surveillance one may conclude that the formulations 
are too vague and general to decide whether a member has carried out 
its "obligations" or not; Article IV(1) ii states that each member 
shall
"seek to promote stability by fostering orderly 
economic and financial conditions and a monetary 
system that does not tend to produce erratic 
disruptions".
It is left to each country to judge whether the market is disorderly 
or rate movements erratic, and to decide the kind of corrective action 
to be taken. Despite many proposals to enhance the effectiveness of 
surveillance,1^ I believe that they will yield nothing. Certainly if 
the surveillance is to have any effect it should be aimed at reshaping 
the domestic economic policies of surplus countries. The Japanese and 
West Germans were quite clear in their attitude regarding the question 
of their domestic economic policies. Their national sovereignty over 
domestic economic policy cannot be compromised. One commentator 
described the outcome of Venice economic summit - among them enhancing
I C.
the IMF surveillance - as "a jumble of vague generalities". 
Ensuring consistency, or at least minimising the conflict between the 
objectives of macroeconomic policies, is technically difficult and 
politically undesirable. The economic policy of a government is 
determined by the bargaining power of different domestic groups. There 
is no reason to disrupt this pattern of interaction for the sake of 
the developing countries and the monetary system .
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The IMF Conditionality
The controversy surrounding the IMF conditionality has been 
lingering over an extended period. Nothing can suggest that the 
arguments and the counterarguments regarding the IMF credit/adjustment 
policy will be halted in the foreseeable future. There are various 
reasons which give rise to the continuous disagreement about the 
subject: the Articles of the Agreement do not explicitly elucidate the 
policies which a member must follow in order to gain access to the 
Fund's resources, the Fund cited the temporary use of its resources 
under adequate safeguards as the legal foundations to justify the 
nature of conditions attached to its credit. On the other hand the 
Articles before the First and the Second amendments did not confer on 
the Executive Board the power to challenge a member's request for a 
credit. The technique that the Executive Board has utilized to develop 
its power is quite interesting.
The circumstances which surround the negotiations for stand-by 
arrangements highlight the issue of whether a member has any real 
scope to "negotiate" the stand-by arrangement or it has no choice but 
to acquiesce to the Fund's terms. The characterization of stand-by 
arrangements as decisions of the Fund has two serious implications 
namely, first, the Fund is arbitrator to monitor, modify and suspend 
any further transactions under the stand-by arrangements and second, 
as a result of such characterization, the stand-by arrangements are 
allowed evasion of parliamentary scrutiny. Consequently, the 
population of a member who bears the burden of these arrangements have
no say.
The stated purpose of the stand-by arrangements is to help a 
member to overcome its balance of payments problems over a reasonable
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period without resorting to measures destructive of national or 
international prosperity. The economic components of the IMF 
programmes dispute the success of the Fund to bring about a viable 
balance of payments.
The first part of this section deals with the origin and the 
development of the Fund conditionality; the second will examine the 
implications of charcterization of the stand-by as the Fund's 
decisions and the third part will be concerned with the economic 
components of the IMF conditionality.
I. Hie origin and the development of the IMF conditionality
The origin^- of conditionality can be imputed from the divergences 
of the American and the British views with regard to the right of 
access to the Fund's resources; whether there should be conditions 
attached to the Fund's credit and the question of the discretionary 
power of the Executive Board. The British, according to their weak 
economic position after the World War II, were in favour of 
unconditional access at least to the extent of a country quota while 
the American negotiator preferred more discretionary power to be 
vested in the Executive Board to evaluate a member's request. The 
result was a compromised formula embodied in Article V (3)a 
(original): a member must present that the currency obtained is 
presently needed for making payments which are consistent with the 
Articles. The power of the Executive Board to evaluate a member's 
request and consequently to impose its conditions remained unsettled. 
According to the original Articles no power was vested in the 
Executive Board to examine a member's request, its discretionary power 
was limited to the waiver clause in Article IV (3)» of which the Fund 
made no use2, further, there is nothing to indicate that the waiver 
clause was purported to give the Fund any discretionary power and
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consequently impose conditions regarding its members' economic 
policies. The Fund can deny access to its General Resources Account 
in specific cases for example, Article V (5) demonstrates the 
ineligibility to use the Fund's resources. A distinction should be 
made between the IMF conditionality and Article V (3) which is 
entitled Conditions governing the use of the Fund's general 
resources .^ Here we are concerned with the first one using it in the 
sense of conditions which the Executive Board attaches to a credit 
from the general resource account by virtue of the discretionary power 
which it vested to itself and developed through consecutive decisions 
utilizing its power of interpretation to overcome any legal hurdle. 
The first decision adopted in this direction was in March 1948.5 It 
states inter alia:
"The word represents in Article V Section 3(a) (i) 
means declares. The member is presumed to have 
fulfilled the condition mentioned in Article V 
Section 3(a) (i) if it declares that the currency 
is presently needed for making payments in that 
currency which are consistent with the provisions 
of the Agreement. But the Fund may, for good 
reasons, challenge the correctness of this 
declaration on the ground that the currency is not 
presently needed or because the payments in that 
currency will not be consistent with the 
provisions of this agreement ... the Fund may 
postpone or reject the request or accept it 
subject to conditions."
The Fund desired to encourage drawings on its resources which
58
were nil in 1950 and in 1951 only two states drew^. The Fund adopted a
decision in February 1952^ to assure members who had made a
demonstrable contribution to the Fund's activities that they can count 
on receiving the overwhelming benefit of any doubt respecting drawings 
which would raise the Fund's holdings by not more than its quota. This 
contribution was equal to the gold subscription plus any net use the 
Fund was making of the member's currency minus any net use by the
member of the currencies of other members. This amount was called the
gold tranche although it does not necessarily remain equal to it.
O
Further decisions were taken to materialize the tranches policy ,
perhaps the most cited one was the decision adopted in 1962.
"The Fund's attitude to request for transactions 
within the first credit tranche - that is, 
transactions which bring the Fund's holdings of a 
member's currency above 100 per cent but not above 
125 per cent of its quota - is a liberal one, 
provided that the member itself is making 
reasonable efforts to solve its problems. Requests 
for transactions beyond these limits require a 
substantial justification. They are likely to be 
favourably received when the drawings or stand by 
arragements are intended to support a sound 
program aimed at establishing or maintaining the 
enduring stability of the member's currency at a
„9
realistic rate of exchange. v
The decisions made drawings under the gold tranche de facto 
unconditional by the first amendment they transferred to a de jure 
one.
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Hie First Amendment of the Articles of the Agreement
The first amendment of the Articles put an end to the contention 
regarding the credit tranches policy and the Fund's competence to 
challenge a member's request for a credit beyond the gold tranche. 
Article I has been amended by adding new words in order to give 
confidence to members by making the Fund's resources temporarily 
available to them under adequate safeguards. New provisions were 
added as follows:
Article V, (3) a:
"The Fund shall adopt policies on the use of its 
general resources, including policies on stand-by 
or similar arrangements, and may adopt special 
policies for special balance of payments problems, 
that will assist members to solve their balance of 
payments problems in a manner consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement and that will 
establish adequate safeguards for the temporary 
use of the general resources of the Fund.
Section (3)c:
"The Fund shall examine a request for a purchase to 
determine whether the proposed purchase would be 
consistent with the provisions of thi^greement 
and the policies adopted under them, provided that 
requests for reserve tranche purchases shall not 
be subject to challenge.
Article XXX (c):
"Reserve tranche means a purchase by a member of 
special drawings rights or the currency of another
member: in exchange for its own currency which does 
not cause the Fund's holdings of the members 
currency in the General Resources Account to 
exceed its quota, provided that for the purpose of 
this definition the Fund may exclude purchases and 
holdings under:
(i) policies on the use of its general 
resources for compensatory financing of export 
fluctuation;
(ii) policies on the use of its general 
resources in connection with the financing of 
contributions to international buffer stocks of 
primary product; and
(iii) other policies on the use of its 
general resources in respect of which the Fund 
decides, by an eighty-five per cent majority of 
the total voting power, that an exclusion shall be 
made.
These new provisions institutionalized a series of the Executive 
Board decisions. The implications of the first amendment as far as the 
conditionality is concerned are manifold:
1) The Fund is to "help" its members in devising policies which 
would assist them to overcome balance of payment problems and to 
ensure the temporary use of the Fund's resources.
2) The Fund now is empowered to examine a member's request for a 
credit.
3) The Fund is authorized to adopt special policies for special
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balance of payments problems: compensatory financing, buffer 
stock financing, supplementary financing and extended facility1® 
provided that all these policies are subject to conditionality, 
the Fund is in position to apply different standards of 
conditionality. Article XIX(j) stipulates that policies other 
than the compensatory financing policy could not float in other 
words, the Fund would exclude when it calculates its holdings of 
a member's currency for the purpose of gold and credit tranche 
policies - whatever the member has obtained in transactions under 
the compensatory financing policy."
4) Article V (3)a made a clear reference to stand-by and the 
characterization of the stand-by arrangements as decisions of the 
Fund was included in Article XXX(b). The only substantial change 
which was introduced by the second amendment was in connection 
with the Fund facilities thus reversing the trend of the first 
amendment.
Two reviews of the conditionality took place - the first was by 
decision no. 260 3 September 20, 1968.11 It called to take into 
consideration the necessity for adequate safeguards for the use of the 
Fund's resources; the need for flexibility and uniformity of treatment 
of all members; the importance of consultation clauses and phasing 
appropriate performance criteria to evaluate the implementation of 
program with a view to ensuring the achievement of its objectives and 
the avoidance of language having a contractual flavour. The second 
review13 took place in March 1979; the first paragraph aimed at 
encouraging members to adopt corrective policies which can be 
supported by the Fund's resources. The Fund recognized that an 
adjustment programme cannot be achieved through a short period, 
therefore, it provided that the period may extend up to but not beyond
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three years, the non-contractual nature of stand-by arrangement was 
further emphasized13 thus:
"stand-by arrnagements are not international 
agreements and therefore language having a 
contractual connotation will be avoided in stand­
by arrangements and letters of intent."
The implications of such characterization will be examined at a 
later stage. The Fund expressed its intention that it will pay due 
regard to the domestic, social and political objectives, the economic 
priorities, and the circumstances of members including the causes of 
their balance of payments problems.1  ^ The phrase "it will pay due 
regard" connotes something less than a direction to give decisive 
effect to the considerations to which the Fund must pay due regard.13 
The extent to which the Fund has implemented this paragraph is highly 
questionable.13 Consulation clauses are features of stand-by, they 
may lead to new understandings or modify the performance criteria. The 
stated purpose is to monitor the implementation of an adjustment 
programme but they may vary according to the problems and the 
institutional character of a member. The guidelines on conditionality 
also included preconditions which must be fulfilled by a member in 
advance in order to gain the approval for stand-by. Paragraph 10 
provides that the Fund will review the stand-by and evaluate the 
current macroeconomic policies of the member. The significance of the 
Fund's commitment to macroeconomic policies will be examined when we 
deal with the economic components of the IMF supported programmes. 
Three points must be noted. First, the IMF guideline on conditionality 
implies that the balance of payments problems are amenable to 
correction through the temporary use of the Fund s resources and by
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the deficit countries' action alone. Second, the characterization of 
the stand-by arrangements as decisions of the Fund and its 
implications. Third, the IMF commitment to macroeconomic policies.
The Characterization of Stand-by Arrangements as the Decisions of the 
Fund and its Implications
The main instrument to apply the Fund conditionality is through 
stand-by arrangements. Although it is the outcome of negotiations 
between the IMF and a member who is requesting the Fund's credit 
beyond the reserve tranche the Articles have defined it as a Fund's
1 7
decision-*-' the consequence of such characterization is to give the 
Fund the sole power to interpret, modify, monitor and suspend any 
further transactions under stand-by. Another consequence which follows
from this characterization is that stand-by are allowed to escape the
parliamentary control. The population of a country who bears the 
austerity of such programmes have no say about them. It is not 
surprising that some writers have tended to establish a kind of a link 
between the implementation of IMF programmes and authoritarian 
governments1®. Trie successful implementation of the IMF programmes in 
the 70's in Chile and Argentina was due to the fact that military 
dictatorships were in total control19. Carty noted that:
"the conditionality which is accompanying the 
renewal of commercial loan affects directly the 
interests of the whole population of the 
developing countries. Therefore it is sensible to 
open up a process of economic decision making 
which is seen at present to escape parliamentary
control and the pressure of directly effected
interest groups. Without social consensus one
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might expect that policies which have major 
distributive consequences will not be 
maintained."20
Another related question is whether governments have any real 
scope for negotiations. Many factors undermine "the freely negotiated" 
arrangements; the description of the IMF as a "lender of last resort"
- regardless of the technical accuracy of this description - the
governments strife for political survival and the availability of
other financial resources are contigent upon the Fund's seal of
approval. The same arguments can be equally applied to negate the
Fund's claim that structuring of a stabilization programmes is the
sole responsibility of a member who, in the first place, requested the
stand-by. Hie member as an initiator for the IMF credit has to devise
a programme which satisfies the IMF otherwise it will not gain access
to the Fund's credit. This part will not engage in discussing the
accuracy of stand-by characterization but rather the implications of
such characterization and the need to review the IMF's unique 
91technique.
The process of negotiating stand-by is initiated by a member who 
approaches the Fund by submitting a letter of intent. A letter of 
intent is a document issued by the authorized organ of a government - 
usually is signed by a governor of a central bank or finance minister
- and outlines the economic policy which the government intends to 
implement in order to get the Fund's approval for credit. A mission of 
the Fund "helps" in drawing up the letter. The letter is not legally 
binding and it is not drafted in promissory language.22 The non- 
obligatory character of the letter of intent does not mean that there 
is no consequence for non-observance of the declared policies because
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the letter of intent is usually incorporated into stand-by as 
performance criteria22. The Fund is empowered to suspend any further 
transactions under stand-by if the member did not conform to the terms 
of the performance criteria. Article XXX(b) defines a stand-by as a 
decision of the Fund by which a member is assured that it will be able 
to make purchases from the General Resources Account in accordance 
with the terms of the decision during a specified period and up to a 
specified amount. The reason for the omission of reference to the 
leter of intent in this definition is that the stand-by is taken to 
support the objectives and policies set forth in the letter which are 
incorporated in the stand-by and became terms of the decision. Dam 
o b s e r v e d ^  that a stand-by arrangement presents the contradiction that 
the drawing country does not have to establish a need at the time the 
arrangement is entered into and the Fund in effect waives any power to 
judge need at the time the drawing is made. The reason that the Fund 
will not challenge the member's need for drawing at the time the 
drawing occurs is that the Fund finds that its conditionality and the
pc
member's commitments are sufficient safeguards for the Fund.
According to the Fund a member might be deterred from requesting 
a stand-by arrangement despite its need because of the fear of its 
political implications. A government's position might be worsened if 
the government's freedom of action is constrained by an agreement with 
an external authority to pursue a set of economic and financial 
policies.26 The Fund thought that this deterrent may be overcome by 
characterization of stand-by as a decision of the Fund while at the 
same time it would serve the Fund's policy to encourage requests for 
stand-by and discourage requests for immediate transactions in the 
credit tranche because stand-by is the most effective way to protect 
the Fund's resources against improper use. The first argument is not
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well founded because a state is entitled under international law to 
conclude agreements which limit its freedom of action. The reluctance 
of states to enter into stand-by is attributed to the stringency of 
the conditions connected with the stand-by and their high social 
costs. Examination of the ramifications of the IMF characterization of 
stand-by arrangements will display the Fund's dominant position and 
its unfettered power in regard to stand-by.
1. Although stand-by arrangements do not include a clause enabling 
the Fund to terminate them, the Fund can cancel them under its
07
general' power to terminate its decision.
2. As a result of such characterization the members have no judicial 
or other procedure available to them as a right by which they can 
enforce the terms of stand-by against the Fund.^®
3. The Fund cannot modify the objectives and policies of a member as 
stated in the letter of intent but the Executive Board can modify 
the proposed terms of the stand-by without seeking the
OQ
concurrence of the concerned member.^
4. The Fund takes the view that it is entitled to interpret the
parts of the letter of intent which are incorporated into the
30stand-by because they become part of the Fund's decision.
The other related issue is concerned with the extent to which a 
member can freely negotiate the terms of a stand-by arrangement. The 
way in which the Fund distances itself from the components of its 
programmes is amazing. It is the responsibility of a member to devise 
j^g economic objectives and policies, the Fund will support them by 
approving stand-by which is taken in support of the member's economic 
policies as stated in its letter of intent. Therefore, the question
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arises as to whether a member can devise its objectives and economic 
policies according to its own choice. First it should be noted that 
whatever the member's legal entitlement to draw may be there is no 
legal entitlement to a stand-by arrangement.^ Consequently, the 
member has to pattern its economic policies according to the Fund's 
standards or otherwise it will not get the support of the Managing 
Director.
"The Managing Director will recommend that the 
Executive Board approve a member's request for the 
use of the Fund's general resources in the credit 
tranches when it is in his judgement that the 
program is consistent with the Fund's provisions 
and policies and that it will be carried out."
In addition, to satisfy the IMF preconditions the member's
objectives and policies should be consistent with the IMF vision of
what is best for the member. As it was mentioned earlier the resort to
the Fund implies first of all, that other financial resources have 
been exhausted and the availability of new resources is conditioned on 
the IMF seal of approval and second, since in most cases the 
negotiation for stand-by arrangements occurs in the middle of an 
economic crisis, the government's struggle for a political survival 
will force them to accept what the Fund has to offer.
The Economic Components of the IMF Conditionality
The declared purpose of the IMF conditionality is to help a 
member to achieve a viable balance of payments by making the IMF 
resources available on a temporary basis, under adequate safeguards, 
in order to protect the revolving character of the IMF resources. It
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is quite legitimate for the IMF or any other institution to protect 
its resources, but the main issue is whether the set of policies which 
the IMF attaches to its credit beyond the first credit tranche is 
serving the purposes of protecting the IMF resources and bringing 
about a viable balance of payments without restoring to measures 
destructive of national or international prosperity. Or, whether 
these policies go beyond the requirements of the Articles of the 
Agreement. The legitimacy of these policies can be contested against 
the Articles, especially Article 1. The quarrel between the developing 
countries and the Fund is not about the principle of conditionality 
and the fact that the Fund's financial assistance should be 
conditional upon the adoption of adjustment policies, rather the 
contention concerns the validity of this set of economic policies 
aimed at bringing about a viable balance of payment without high 
social and economic costs. Guitian notes:
"Under most circumstances, adjustment will take 
place whether or not there is a policy action, in 
the sense that claims on resources will eventually 
have to be limited to those available. The issue 
at stake, therefore, is not whether adjustment 
will be carried out - because it will be - but 
whether it will be carried out efficiently - that 
is without involving unwarranted welfare losses."
There are several reasons for the continuous disagreement between 
the IMF and the developing countries about the subject, viz:
1. The increasing involvement of the IMF in a sphere of activities 
which belong to states consequently the impact of conditionality 
on the states' sovereignty.
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2. The causes of disequilibrium: the IMF is still of the view that 
the domestic mismanagement of the economy is the main reason for 
disequilibrium. It disregards the external factors and its 
effects on the balance of payments.
3. As the result of the former preception the IMF policy instruments 
to overcome the balance of payments problems require deflationary 
policies: credit squeeze, devaluation, cutting down public sector 
expenditure. The developing countries view these remedies as 
anti-developmental and tend to favour the foreign investors and 
the private sector.
4. The lack of symmetry in the IMF programmes tend to put the burden 
of adjustment on the poor countries, which are asking for its 
credit, while there is no equivalent method to constrain the 
surplus countries and the reserve currency countries to adjust 
their economic policies which have adverse effects on the 
economies of the developing countries.
5. The two principles which the Fund upholds in all programmes - 
uniformity and flexibility of treatment^5 - resulted in 
disregarding the institutional character of individual countries 
and to double standards in applying different conditionality to 
the same situation. They run contrary to their declared purposes.
Each of these factors will be examined in detail.
An appreciation of the economic policy which is implicit in the 
Fund's Articles of Agreement would provide better understanding of the 
IMF policies. Article 1 exhibits a strict adherence to the classical 
economic theory of comparative advantage. The Fund adopts the
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proposition that free trade and international specialization of labour 
lead to increase worldwide productivity, high standards of living and 
even development. In the Annual Report 197634 the Fund attributed the 
cause of balance of payments problems to inefficient and 
indiscriminate investment patterns as follows:
"... payments imbalance has at times been more 
directly associated with particular investment 
decisions made by a country. If investments are 
directed to activities which are not well suited 
to the country's potential, they will fail to 
yield adequate economic returns and will tend to 
weaken the balance of payments. The determination 
of an optimum investment pattern is, however, not 
an easy task. It is not always possible, for 
example to identify precisely the areas where the 
country's latest advantage in production lies ... 
while these basic difficulties may understandably 
give rise to pressures on resources and create 
payments difficulties, more frequently problems 
have arisen because allocation of investments was 
not based upon productivity consideration."
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Fund has aimed at the 
elimination of restrictions on international payments, discriminatory 
currency practice and conditioned the availability of its financial 
resources to member states on their removal of restrictions on trade 
and payments. Various objections can be raised against this abstract 
theory of comparative advantage which has consequently undermined the 
rationale underlying the IMF programmes. The concept that the market
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knows best is an illusive one because the prevailing type of market is
monopolostic competition. The developing countries do not lack only
the economic flexibility which permits adequate response and therefore 
gain from appropriate changes in the market but also they lack the 
existence of a substantial degree of competitive equality. The IMF 
ignores the deterioration of terms of trade; the manufactured products 
of the industrialized nations and the primary products of the 
developing countries. It has been noted that:
"Twenty-four years ago, it took 200 tons of sugar
to buy a 180 HP bulldozer, now it takes 800 tons
of sugar at the world market price to buy that
or
same bulldozer".
While the developing countries are required to remove 
restrictions on trade, the Fund has not reacted towards the growth of 
protectionism against the exports of the developing countries. 
Ironically the Fund's jurisdiction lacks regulatory authority to 
compel the avoidance or withdrawal of protectionist trade measures the 
Fund is not able to validate or invalidate trade measures as such. 
This double standard of the IMF has enhanced the notion that is not 
more than a vehicle of imperialism and economic colonialism. The 
general liberalization of monetary and tariff, the reliance on the 
market forces, the failure to link trade theory with the differential 
development of productive capacity in various countries would make it 
possible for the strongest countries to adopt "beggar-thy-neighbour 
policy". The logical implications of this policy on the domestic level 
are to support the groups which can take advantage of the market and 
consequently the entrenchment of these groups in the centres of 
political power.
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Devaluation of a currency in order to make exports more 
competitive and imports more restricted is ill-conceived37. The 
exports are priced on the world market in foreign currency, thus 
devaluation will not effect this price although it may raise the 
domestic currency price and the profitability of exporting, however, 
this is not automatically implied by devaluation rather it is 
conditioned on other financial policies such as, less beneficial 
exchange rate for the producers. Regarding imports, the increase of 
the domestic price of imports may not raise to the full extent of 
devaluation but may even fall if devaluation is accompanied by the 
removal of import restrictions which kept the price at an artificially 
high level. Furthermore, it is well established that the effect of 
devaluation is purely transitory. A study of the Tanzanian experience 
in the 1970s showed that Tanzania's reluctance to devalue its currency 
is due to the fact that any attempt to devalue its currency involving 
an increase of its share of export would provoke retaliation. 
Furthermoe, the distributional affect of devaluation on income will 
shift income from the relatively poor producers of food to the richer 
exporter of cash crops which is inconsistent with Tanzania's social 
objectives and the goal of raising food production. In addition to 
exposing the developing countries to inflationary pressure it may
OQ
start competitive devaluation amongst them.
Another theoretical aspect of the IMF conditionality which has 
determined the nature of conditions attached to its credit is its 
diagnosis of the causes of balance of payments problems. Guitian 
observed that:
"Imbalances in an economy are usually reflected in 
the prevalence of inflation and balance of 
payments deficits which are often associated with
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relatively high levels of economic activity but 
soon lead to low rates of employment and growth.
These imbalances can be due to a variety of 
factors but one common element that generally 
characterizes them is an excessive or 
unsustainable expansion in aggregate demand. In 
most instances variation in aggregate demand and 
expenditure associated - as they often are - with 
a relatively stable aggregate supply function are 
the major causes of short-run fluctuations in 
output, prices and the balance of payments. These 
broad considerations are behind the demand 
management approach to stabilization policy, which 
is designed to monitor the performance of the 
economy over the short time in order to keep the 
level of growth rate of aggregate demand in line 
with the level and the growth rate of productive
IQ
capacity".
The remedy is to restrain fiscal spending or raise fiscal revenues in 
order to limit the size of the resulting public sector deficit to the 
amount of noninflationary financing available.40
This monetary approach to the balance of payment - which is the 
Fund philosophy - is based on classical principle of equilibrium 
economics which suggests that inflation is the result of a 
disequilibrium between aggregate demand and supply. The total demand 
on goods and services is more than the value of the output; this 
excessive demand inevitably inflates prices within the economy. In 
order to restore equilibrium, the total spending on goods and services
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should be equalized to the total value of a nation's production. This 
internal disequilibrium will adversely affect the country's 
international payments position. Deficit can only be persistent if it 
is accompanied by domestic credit creation, governments cannot 
continue to absorb deficit by running down their foreign exchange 
reserve, they will have ultimately to restrict domestic credit 
creation. The Fund has advocated the adoption of monetary and fiscal 
policies to curb excessive demand and consequently, the reduction of 
public and private consumption in order to increase savings necessary 
for investment and net capital formation.
The logic of this approach entails cutting down government 
expenditure, lifting subsidies, reducing governments wage bills. 
Objections abound regarding the appropriation of this approach to the 
developing countries' conditions: the credit squeeze in LDCs leads to 
recession rather than more investment, it is too difficult to generate 
savings when poverty prevails, what is required is a stimulation of 
additional income rather than reducing consumption in order to 
generate savings.4^ The coalescence of credit squeeze on domestic 
capitalists, the increase in the costs of the imported material needed 
for local industry as a result of currency devaluation, and, the 
shrinking market will lead to take over of domestically owned business 
by multinational companies.42 However, the IMF bias towards foreign 
and multinational companies is an obvious one, this can be deduced 
from its concept of balance of payments in that the IMF, by placing 
investment income firmly in the goods and services section of the 
balance of payments, ensures that restrictions on payments to foreign 
investors cannot legitimately be imposed under the IMF rules.
The IMF approach, as noted earlier, is insensitive to the 
external factors and their impact upon balance of payments, by
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attributing domestic mismanagement as the principal cause for balance 
of payments problems, the Fund assumes that the governments of the 
developing countries are in full control of their economy which is an 
unrealistic assumption since managing economic policy has proved to be 
a very tricky work even in developed countries. The developing 
countries are much more vulnerable to external shocks especially since 
most of them are dependent on their earnings from exporting primary 
commodities. Introducing new facilities — like compensatory financing 
facility - does not indicate any serious shift in the Fund's attitude 
that imbalances call for adjustment regardless of their origin and 
there is no need to change the policy instruments. These facilities 
are conventional short term programmes.^
The credit ceiling device requires a highly developed financial 
system. Controlling public expenditure has proved technically very 
difficult even in Britain with its developed financial system. The 
same applies to increasing of taxes. In addition, many developing 
countries are too poor and too politically weak for a high tax 
burden.^ Despite the degree of professionalism of the IMF staff in 
devising stabilization programmes, these programmes are going to be 
implemented within a geo-political environment, consequently, these 
programmes should be adapted to suit such environment and should have 
regard to the administrative capacity to run such programmes in the 
developing countries.
The most serious challenge to the IMF monetarism which has its 
profound influence on the Third World claims to change the rationale 
of the IMF programmes comes from the structuralist school. It argues 
that IMF programmes have no lasting effect because they fail to 
indentify the causes of disequilibrium. This school of thought 
originated in Lcitin American countries when the stabilization
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programmes designed for the Chilean government in 1955 went under 
scrutiny by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America 
and by a team of private consultants.^ They argued that the 
historical development of Latin American economies had resulted in a 
structure of production and trade and institutional features that 
inhibited smooth alterations in supply in response to changes in the 
composition of aggregate demand that would be expected to occur as 
growth proceeded. According to them the structural imbalances in the 
economy are the source of balance of payments problems, these 
imbalances in turn arise from the fact that growth and development 
involve a discontinuous process of structural change. For example, 
they identified that institutional factors such as land tenure 
arrangements are the main source for the bottleneck in the supply of 
agricultural commodities - landowners are not involved directly in 
agricultural production and tenants had neither the motivation nor the 
resources to exploit the land potential; consequently, the 
agricultural output is often unable to respond to the increased 
demand. Rising urban population and increased incomes in the 
industrial sector deriving from the import substitution activities 
increased the demand for food. Given the inelastic supply, inflation 
presure was inevitable. Second, a low and unstable rate of earnings 
due to variable demand for primary commodity exports coupled with the 
need to import physical capital which requires foreign exchange would 
lead to a foreign exchange shortage. This shortage would entail a 
contraction of capital goods imports coupled with a fall in investment 
and growth. Finally, the inadequacy of the government finance which is 
heavily dependent on export taxes for revenue. The unequal 
distribution of income and the accompanying concentration of political 
power tended to make significant tax reform impossible and resort to
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inflationary deficit financing was viewed as a structural problem. The 
merit of the structuralism will be discussed in the next chapter.
With regard to the symmetry problem, conditionality demonstrates 
the growing leverage of the IMF on the countries which are forced to 
ask for its financial assistance. The IMF system has not developed 
instruments which are conducive to surplus countries and reserve 
countries currency to adjust their economic policies which result in 
repercussions on the economics of the developing countries. The 
upsurge in the interest cost of foreign borrowing from both public and 
private institutions is the direct result of the financial and 
monetary policies applied by the industrial countries in dealing with 
inflation and consequently, they worsen the imbalance of payments 
position of the developing countries.4** The inconsistency of the 
Fund's policies is obvious, while they seek to encourage the exports 
of the developing countries at the same time they advocate further 
reduction in the aggregate demand in the industrial countries - which 
provide the principal markets for LDCs export supply in order to 
combat inflation.49 The logic of the IMF policies is that if nothing 
can be done against the surplus countries there is no choice for the 
deficit countries but to adjust accordingly. The adjustment cannot be 
seen as a matter of disciplining deficit countries to restrain their 
fiscal and monetary policies. There is the question of symmetry of 
adjustment responsibilities.
The Uniformity and the Flexibility of Treatment Between Countries
Tfie IMF programmes seek to uphold two principles: uniformity and 
fl'eicii^ il1!1^  of treatment among its members.^® Uniformity of treatment
that for any given degree of need the effort 
of economic adjustment sought by the Fund in
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programs be broadly equivalent among its 
members.
Killick noted51 that
"... however seriously the staff may seek to 
achieve this outcome. They are unable to do so.
Executive directors, civil servants and members of 
the Fund's staff all agree that in practice there 
are considerable inequalities of treatment".
This is due to the political pressures in the decision-making 
process in the Executive Board as explained in the second chapter. 
Flexibility takes into account the institutional characteristics and 
the particular circumstances of different countries. The adjustment 
will vary according to the need of a particular situation. Some 
elements of flexibility were identified in the Fund's programmes.52 
However, the question which is yet to be answered is whether the 
flexibility of IMF programmes is in response to the economic and 
institutional needs of a country or to the political colour of the 
government concerned.
Judging IMF conditionality is a very difficult task because of
53the absence of professional consensus on the IMF policy instruments. 
The effects of its programmes are undetermined, but clearly these 
programmes are fraught with gaps. A reorientation of the IMF policies 
is absolutely necessary to enable them to respond to the needs of the 
developing countries. This idea will be expanded in the following 
chapter.
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CHAPTER POUR
THIRD VORLD DEMANDS
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The power structure of the IMF executive organ is a very 
contentious issue for Third World countries. As discussed in Chapter 2 
of this work the decision-making formula is geared to sustain the 
dominant position of the 'Big Five1. This position was further 
enhanced by inter alia the increase in the regime of special 
majorities giving one country, the U.S.A., effective veto power over 
key issues which affect the entire community; the economic and 
financial centre of power formed by the major industrial countries 
ensuring for them a hegemonial role which overlaps the IMF 
jurisdiction and conflicts with many of the interests of the majority 
of members; and the strategy of the IMF with regard to debt 
rescheduling where one debtor country has to deal with all its 
creditors.
An examination of the composition of the Executive Board would 
reveal the shortcomings of the developing countries' representation. 
One executive director represents twenty-four states-*-. In addition, a 
country representative of developing countries may not have similar 
experiences or interests, for example, it is quite difficult to
o
envisage the extent of common interests between Jamaica and Canada . 
Furthermore, the Western Hemisphere Department which includes Latin 
America and the Caribbean has a U.S. citizen as its director^ It was 
estimated in 1979 that twenty-one LDCs with more than seven per cent 
of IMF votes were represented by northern countries4.
The necessity for proper representation and active participation 
of the developing countries in the decision-making process of the IMF 
should be a precondition for any institutional change within the IMF. 
Several documents and reports have embodied demands for "proper" 
representation for developing countries but it should be noted that 
developing countries, despite their common economic disadvantages, do
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not constitute a homological group. Some of them are oil producers and 
consequently capital exporters, others are dependent on one or perhaps 
two primary commodities so that they differ in their economic 
structures. Any change therefore in the executive organ of the IMF 
must take account of such disparities and allow for representation 
reflective of such important differences.
Interestingly, despite the numerous studies regarding claims for 
change in the decision-making process of the IMF, none has produced an 
alternative. For example, "the Declaration and Principles of the 
Action Programme of Lima"5 called for the introduction of provisions 
in the Articles of Agreement of the IMF in order to increase the 
number of votes allocated to these countries; the Rio Report noted 
that:
"... if the chosen structure is not genuinely 
participatory, it cannot hope to succeed. Among 
other things, it must define the degree of 
participation appropriate to all interest groups 
represented."5A
The 1980 Brandt Report6 argues for the establishment of a broad-based 
leadership to manage the international monetary system "including 
provision for a growing role for the developing countries in the 
decision-making process". The South-North Conference on the 
"International Monetary System and the New International Order", which 
took place at the Arusha International Conference Centre in Tanzania, 
concluded that the main attribute of a new monetary system must be 
'Democractic management and control' while at the same time admitting 
that significant influence will be weilded by economically powerful 
countries, in reality, however, there is an absolute necessity for
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clear reflection of the interests of the majority of the world^.
Dismantling of the oligarchic power structure of the IMF should 
be a priority. The "Declaration on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order" adopted by the U.N. General Assembly 
stated in its preamble that a new international economic order should 
be based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence and co­
operation among all states and called for at paragraph C:
"Equal participation of all countries in the 
solving of world economic order in the common
O
interest of all countries."
Part II paragraph d provides for:
"Full and effective participation of developing 
countries in all phases of decision-making for the 
formulation of an equitable and durable monetary 
system and adequate participation of developing 
countries in all bodies entrusted with this reform 
and, particularly, in the proposed Council of
Q
Governors of the International Monetary Fund"^
to ensure effective participation of developing countries in the 
decision-making process through the reform of the existing voting 
system. The "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States" followed 
this pattern. Article 10 provides:
"All states are juridically equal and, as equal 
members of the international community have the 
right to participate fully and effectively in the 
international decision-making process in the
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solution of the world economic, financial and 
monetary problems, inter alia, through the 
appropriate international organization in 
accordance with their existing and evolving rules, 
and to share equitably in the benefits resulting 
therefrom.
On a perusal of the above documents one may conclude that first 
the developing countries do not totally reject the existing system of 
international economic organizations since they did not propose to 
abolish them nor set up new organizations, neither did they pay much 
attention to offering any theory regarding the advancement of further 
institutional development of international economic organisation-*--1-. 
Second, they were unanimous in their demands for changing the voting 
system and argued for more involvement of the developing countries in 
the decision-making process especially in the IMF.
Ifre emphasis on sovereign equality is indicative of a rejection 
of the weighted voting system on the ground that it represents an 
inroad on the sovereign equality of states. Yet no one has proposed a 
formula which guarantees "effective participation in the decision­
making process of the IMF". It is, therefore, being submitted that 
such a formula should be based on the following considerations, viz.:
- one state one vote;
- a majority system which should not allow a small group of states
to have total control over the decision-making process;
- the regrouping of developing countries;
- the Executive Board should take into account the institutional and
economic differences of developing countries. In other words, oil 
producing countries should not be placed on equal footing with 
those countries that are dependent on one or two commodities; 12
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the voting system of the IMF should not be based, as it is at 
present, on the "power of the purse"-^, rather it should be 
replaced by a formula which links the drawings entitlement with 
financial needs. It is paradoxical that the countries with the 
least need for the Fund's financial resources should exercise the 
greatest power in determining the manner in which the funds 
should be spent while the countries which are in most need of 
credit have little say;
the staff of the various departments of the IMF should be 
characterised by an increase of Third World personnel especially 
in areas involved in designing IMF programmes. The main reason is 
that nationals of states are more aware of their countries' 
social and economic priorities. Clearly, the advantage of having 
more Third World staff is that they may be instrumental in 
encouraging their countries to adopt corrective policies thereby 
negating the impression that the policies are imposed upon them 
by outsiders;-*-^
the independence of the Executive Board should be guaranteed by a 
new formula which would enhance its autonomy. The effect would be 
that the Executive Board, rather than defending a set of national 
policies, would be representative of the interests of the 
international community, 
the setting up of an independent dispute settlement body. As noted 
ih the second chapter of this work, the concentration of power in 
the' i Mf Executive Board permits it to interpret and suspend 
transactions according to its own judgement. This authoritarian 
character of the Executive Board should be removed and the power 
o’£ interpretation and assessment of the implementation of IMF 
programmes should be assigned to another body within the
organisation. ^
Although these propositions attempt to establish "minimum 
standards" in the "world of disparities", it is doubtful that the 
industrial countries would allow them any avenue for real 
implementation. There is no reason for the industrial countries to 
upset the present mode of decision-making in the IMF and there exists 
no supranational power to enforce change in the decision-making 
process.
Not only is the decision-making process of the IMF in need of 
reform but also its economic policies have always remained a subject 
of much discontent among Third World countries. The changing patterns 
of economic relations question the validity of the IMF policies and 
underlines the need for radical changes in both the rationale of these 
policies and the structure of the organization itself.
The deterioration of the balance of payment position in many 
developing countries emanates from a very hostile economic environment 
- the increase in the oil price? the falling of their exports' 
receipts as a result of a shrinking market coupled with the ever­
growing protectionism; the decline in real value of commodity prices 
compared with the rise in prices of manufactured goods from the 
industrial countries and the consequent rise in the cost of the 
physical capital needed for development projects; the adverse effects 
of industrial countries' policies - which lead not only to greater 
deficit but also to qualitative deficits which are not liable to 
correction through IMF financial terms. The authors of 'The Quest for 
Economic Stabilization' have made the point thus:
"A large proportion of oil-importing LDCs is faced 
with persistent unviable BOP deficits. A great
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deal of the deterioration in their payments 
situation in recent years has been the result of 
largely irreversible adverse movements: in their 
commodity terms of trade - a deteriorating current 
account is no longer prima facie evidence of the 
pursuit of excessively expansionary domestic 
demand policies —  ; and restoration of a healthy 
BOP requires longer-term changes in the structure 
of production and demand."-^
Developing countries' balance of payments problems are, 
therefore, admittedly of a structural character and dealing with such 
deficits would necessitate permutations in the volume of finance as 
well as the instruments and objectives of the IMF programmes. The 
argument of the IMF that its Articles of Agreement compel it to 
provide financial assistance for purposes of balance of payment 
problems is not well-founded. First, Article 1 states quite 
categorically that one of the purposes of the Fund is the maintenance 
of high levels of employment, income and economic development through 
balanced growth of international trade. However, the Fund's obsession 
with reduction of inflation has tended in practice to disregard the 
negative impacts of its programmes on the primary objectives. Second, 
the distihbtion between balance of payments assistance and development 
assisfahee1 is difficult to draw. One writer notes:
development programme which involves industrial 
diners if iea tion may in the long term have a very 
^Sfcglbie effect on the balance of payment, whilst 
baiahee of payments assistance which enables 
internal ad^istmOnt to be undertaken less rapidly
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than it would otherwise need to be may have 
definite implications for the pattern of 
development."
He further states:
"Given that the IMF is basically a short-term 
balance of payments stabilization institution, it 
can be seen that the conditionality of financial 
assistance may either help or hinder development, 
depending on the causes of any particular balance 
of payments deficit."^®
Evidently the IMF economic policies work to the disadvantage of 
developing countries both internally and in their relations with the 
international community. As a consequence a change in the philosophy 
of the IMF is inevitable. Following are submissions regarding changes 
aimed at reconstructing the IMF programmes.
It is important that IMF programmes be aimed at achieving healthy
balance of payments through structural change by reorientating the
productive systems, stimulating output and focussing on key
bottlenecks and constraints within the productive system as well as
diversification of the industrial structure in order to minimize the
conflict between development policy of the country concerned and the
objectives of stabilization programmes, thus lessening the high social
19and economic costs of its programmes.
It has been noted that it is easier to solve the absorption 
problem by raising incomes rather than by cutting expenditure thus 
financing the government's budget becomes easier causing sustained 
saving levels necessary for investment. However, the better course
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would be to explore areas in which countries have the potential to 
increase their exports thus diversifying the tradeable goods rather 
than relying on traditional commodities. Ways should be sought to 
reduce imports through efficient import-substitution. Such a strategy 
requires placing more emphasis on the supply—oriented measures rather 
than undue emphasis on the control of aggregate demand.2® However, 
this should not lead to the conclusion that the control of aggregate 
demand is not significant. In fact it should be supplementary to the 
supply-oriented measures.
Micro-economic measures should be introduced within the IMF 
programmes21 because although the IMF claim that its policies are 
committed to macro-economic measures only, in effect the distinction 
between macro-economic and micro-economic instruments tends to be 
blurred in the context of adjustment and growth.22 While macro- 
economic instruments affect the productive sectors in differential 
ways, micro-economic measures aimed at specific activities can make an 
important contribution to the macro-economic objective of balance of 
payments adjustment.
Structural change requires a lengthy period. The institutional 
reform of productive capacities in any given society cannot be carried 
over one year or even three years as provided for in the conventional 
stand-by arrangements. Rapid BOP adjustment is less appropriate. What 
j_g required is a slower but consistent adjustment in order to allow 
gradual and smoother alteration in the society instead of the "shock 
treatment". Implementation of such strategy requires quantitative 
increase in the Fund's resources. It was estimated that the value of 
the IMF resources as a percentage of world trade has fallen from 12.3 
per cent in 1960 to 3.2 per cent in 1981.24 The current deficit of 
non-oil LDCs amounted to $233bn. Net Fund credit has financed less
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than $10bn in 1974-79. The increase of financial help to the deficit 
countries should correspond to the size of balance of payments 
problems. This increase in financial flow can be achieved by:
1) increase in the developing countries' quotas.
2) linking the allocation of SDRs to financial needs,
3) channelling of the Fund's earnings from the sale of gold to 
developing countries" favour,
4) giving the IMF a greater role with regard to recycling surpluses,
5) enhancing the IMF’s supervisory role regarding Bank lending.26
Another complaint emanating from the Third World is that "the
Fund uses an almost medieval bargaining technique" in negotiating
programmes. It tries to extract maximum concession. As noted in
97Chapter 3, the govenments have limited scope regarding "negotiation"
with the IMF. It is being submitted that the Letter of Intent should
be negotiated during the visit of the Fund's mission to the country in
question. The current practice of presenting a pre-drafted Letter of
Intent does not appear to represent any real commitment on the part of
the particular government. Such a document should emanate basically
from the government and broad consensus in drafting the letter is more
desirable than use of the Fund's one-sided bargaining power. This
should lead to successful implementation of adjustment policies and
ultimately more awareness of the country's social and economic needs.
28The precondition clauses should be abolished.
Additionally, the Fund should pay greater attention to the 
political consequences of its stabilization programmes and their 
effects on income distribution. It is the view of many developing 
countries that "a number of the Fund's staff members lack sensitivity 
to political and social realities". The IMF staff is not
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professionally qualified to undertake systematic political analysis.29
Greater weight should be given to the political and economic
structure of the country concerned. This can be overcome, as it was
suggested earlier, by increasing the Third World staff in the
organization and by avoiding too much emphasis on the technical
considerations. Hie capacity for adjustment does not solely pertain to
economic factors rather it relates to many other variables such as
labour mobilization, access to other sources of credit, the
administrative capacity to run to IMF programmes for example. All
these factors differ from one country to another, consequently, a
reinterpretation of the principle of uniformity of treatment is 
30necessary.
With regard to the effects of the IMF policies on income 
distribution, it was noticeable that there is an absence of any 
protection to the poorer classes m  the society . These policies tend 
to enhance and preserve the power of the rich while reducing 
drastically the incomes of the working class. An apt description of 
the policies is that they cut the champagne of the rich and the bread 
of the poor.
Furthermore, achievement of symmetery^ of the Fund's operations 
is essential to ensure equitable and fair treatment. The IMF has never 
been equipped with either the resources or the legal instruments to 
influence surplus countries. Its institutional weaknesses are readily 
observable as already noted, in the areas of surveillacne and scarce 
currency clauses which have been characterised by gross inefficiency. 
Anthony Carty^ has properly questioned the reasoning behind the 
insistence or adoption of policies which adversely affect the welfare 
of developing countries while developed countries are unwilling to 
accommodate any restricting policies. Hie Finance Minister of Brazil
96
has raised a similar argument in questioning the rationale behind the 
idea that the interests of multinational banks should take priority 
over the welfare of the people of Brazil.
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CONCLUSION
Hie Existence of the international Monetary Fund as it functions 
at the present is justified by a very orthodox economic legal concept. 
The Articles of the Agreement are too general and vague to be 
considered as the "world economic constitution". As an organization it 
has lost its autonomy. All the major decisions in the international 
monetary relations are taken by a small group of states in response to 
their economic interests with a disregard of the monetary "system". 
International monetary "cooperation" in practice means cooperation 
among the group of tea Ihe IMF has limited its role to commendation 
of the merits of the economic summits of the major industrial 
countries, the outcome being merely political diplomatic statements 
rather than any commitment to specific measures.
The IMF policies have tended to widen the gap between the North- 
South division, creditor-debtor nation. Admitting that the special 
needs of the developing countries do not mean that they constitute a 
separate class, the main purpose of these policies is to ensure the 
repayments of its credit and loans to the multinational banks. 
Furthermore, these policies offer a temporary solution to the disorder 
in the international financial relations rather than address the 
causes of the disorder. On the domestic scale any success in bringing 
about a viable balance of payment without involving destructive 
measures to national and international prosperity is highly
questionable.
The developed countries have neither the will nor the interest to 
enhance the role of the IMF except to the extent that the IMF serves 
their intersts and their foreign investments. They have worked out 
their own institutional alternatives.
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The developing countries' demands for changes in the IMF lack any 
comprehensive framework because they have focused only on three 
issues, namely, appropriate representation, symmetry of the IMF 
programmes, and increase in the Fund's resources and furthermore these 
demands do not provide for instruments to realize their ends. They are 
formulated in general imprecise language. At best they are appeals to 
principles of justice and equity and have never been enhanced by any 
action. It is very doubtful if moral persuasion can produce any 
tangible results. It would have been more fruitful if the LDCs 
attempted to advance a kind of legal framework for their demands.
A prerequisite for an economic order is a legal order. The 
monetary arrangements which have been evolved can best be 
characterized as diplomatic arrangements. They are non-binding 
declarations of intentions. Their vague, general wording and 
formulations meet the technical requirements of legal norms to a very 
limited extent. If these arrangements are to acquire the character of 
"law", they should be objectively definite, binding and uniform. 
Article IV of the Articles of Agreement, for example, in outlining 
general obligations of members declares that:
"... a principal objective is the continuing 
development of the orderly underlying conditions that 
3i-p necessary for financial and economic stability ...
Such wording lacks the force of law, the words "orderly underlying 
conditions" have not been defined. Similarly, Article IV(n) speaks of 
"erratic disruptions" which is lacking in precision in the same manner 
as the formulation "to gain an unfair competitive advantage ..." in
Article IV(iii).
Contrary to the claim that the decentralized nature of the
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international society entails such general and vague formulations, 
this horizontal nature of the international society is a forceful 
ground for having precise rules and to set up limits to the discretion 
of states to decide whether they are bound or not.
The other related issue of this monetary-diplomacy is the 
pragmatic approach to the monetary relations. The introduction of 
compensatory financing facility or rescheduling debts will never 
"heal" the problem of the developing countries. There is a deliberate 
avoidance of the causes of these problems. The economic policies have 
tended to deal with the effects of the imbalances in the world economy 
rather than tackling the origin of these problems. Furthermore this 
approach precludes developing "consciousness" ojp a system. By system 
is meant a set of legal rules which ensures coordination of various 
economic policies between sovereign states with different political, 
economic, social and legal ideologies, ends and methods, in order to 
make a comprehensive legal theory an essential precondition for 
rationalizing the whole complex issue of the international economic 
process. Only legal and organizational rules can constitute a desired 
long-term framework for the economic process.
The legal aspects of the international economic relations should 
be emphasized. Economics is not a rigorous discipline but rather a 
controversial one. For example, in identifying the causes of 
inflation, Friedman attributed the blame to the policies of full 
employment, welfare states policies, which raise governments’ 
spending, while Bullock and Yaffe said that the declining 
profitability among private capitalists will tempt them to acquire the 
profits required for further accumulation by increasing prices thereby 
effecting an increase in money supply through the extenion of credit 
and state loans providing the guarantee that commodities will be sold
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at these prices. There is not any economic concept or principle to 
determine the optimal exchange rate. Instead of undue emphasis on 
economic concepts, attention should be directed toward exploring legal 
criteria to delineate the right and the wrong in national decisions 
which have repercussions on the international monetary conditions. 
This is judged not only by the controversial nature of economics but 
also by the fact that national economies are highly connected with 
each other.
Under the present monetary arrangements it is left to the 
discretion of the national policy makers to formulate their external 
and domestic policies. It is normal that priority will be given to the 
national interests. A country whose currency constitutes a major 
trading currency can devalue or revalue according to its national 
interests. Consequently, the national policy makers can directly 
influence the monetary conditions on a global scale which would impact 
on other states, for example, the upsurge in interest rates and the 
volatility of the exchange rates in the international scenario are the 
direct results of developed countries1 internal financial policies. It 
is, therefore, vital that national decisions be subject to 
international standards. Ironically^ the Second Amendment of the 
Articles gives the member states a "free hand in their exchange rate 
policies. The New International Economic Order by its undue emphasis 
on economic sovereignty also sanctions individual freedom of action 
which is inconsistent with the setting up of international standards
to govern the global financial relations.
The approach that national decisions be subject to international 
standards questions the usefulness of the classical notion of economic 
sovereignty in accordance with the international economic 
interdependence. It is one example that explains how legal concepts
105
can participate in solving the dilemma of international economic 
relations. It is the task of the legal writers to advance a theory for 
economic relations between sovereign states that would lay down 
criteria to encourage orderly and systematic approaches to the present 
disorder in monetary relations thus enabling effecting participation 
of all countries with a view to solving world economic problems.
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